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The Survival of "Last Hired, First Fired"
under Title VII and Section 1981
THE IssuE
A predictable result of the current reduction in work force needs'
has been the increased attention focused on the validity of industry-
wide layoff procedures under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act2
and section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (hereinafter referred
to as Title VII and section 1981). Title VII defines unlawful employ-
ment practices and section 1981 is a general prohibition against dis-
crimination.
The principle that differences in length of service merit special con-
sideration in the event of layoffs has received wide acceptance in both
the private and governmental employment sectors.4 Seniority rules are
designed by parties to collective bargaining agreements as a means of
granting the least advantages to new employees in the work unit and
the greatest advantages to the most senior employees. Generally,
these seniority provisions are racially neutral in nature. In their ap-
plication to minority workers, the plans are intended to have the same
impact as they would have on any new admittee to the unit.5 A special
problem is raised, however, where employers, guilty of discriminatory
1. The unemployment rate in the United States was 8.2 percent as of January, 1975.
There were 7.5 million civilians out of work. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T
OF LABOR, BULL. No. 21-7, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(j) (1974). These provisions describe unlawful em-
ployment practices by an employer, employment agency, labor organization or joint la-
bor-management committee.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974), provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and all pro-
ceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind and to no other.
4. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATSTCS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1209, ANALYSIS
OF LAYOFF, RECALL, AND WORK-SHARINo PROCEDURES IN UNION CONTRACTS 19 (March
1957).
5. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 1603
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Sobol].
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hiring practices before the enactment of Title VII,6 apply a "last hired,
first fired" seniority system in determining layoff orders. In such in-
stances, minority employees who were denied work in the past and thus
a chance to acquire seniority in a given unit, find themselves bearing
the brunt of today's mass layoffs. In contrast, their white colleagues,
who gained employment and acquired seniority during a time when
employers refused to hire minorities, have been able to maintain con-
tinual employment under the system.
This article critically analyzes the following proposition: The pres-
ent continuation of a "last hired, first fired" employment seniority sys-
tem for layoff determinations by employers who implemented discrimi-
natory hiring practices before 1964 perpetuates the effects of such
practices and therefore is not a bona fide seniority system under Title
VII and section 1981.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SENORITY
Of the many provisions found in collective bargaining contracts,
those governing the operation of seniority systems are of major im-
portance to the contracting parties. A 1971-72 study conducted by the
United States Department of Labor disclosed that 75 percent of all ma-
jor collective bargaining agreements contain seniority provisions. 7
Both labor and management share in the realization that the exist-
ence of an objective standard based on seniority is a necessary and
beneficial means of allocating employment rights. Labor's demand for
the application of seniority systems can be attributed to three funda-
mental factors. First, seniority systems provide all employees with a
basis for reliably predicting their future employment positions." Ad-
herence to an objective seniority system by management has become
an essential step in labor's continuous pursuit of increased economic
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)-(5) (1974), which defines unlawful employment prac-
tices and the related conciliation and enforcement procedures, was enacted on July 2,
1964, but did not become effective until 1 year later.
7. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-14, MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY 32 (1972). For
this study of selected provisions pertaining to the administration of seniority, the Bureau
examined 1,974 major collective bargaining agreements, each covering 1000 workers or
more, representing almost all agreements of this size in the United States, except those
in the railroad and airline industries and in government. The agreements, which were
current at the beginning of 1971, applied to more than 8.2 million workers or nearly
half the total coverage of collective bargaining agreements outside the excluded indus-
tries.
8. See generally Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1, 5-7 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Gould]; S. SLICHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 104 (1960) [hereinafter cited as SLICHTER].
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security. In industries characterized by a steady reduction in total em-
ployment, the employees' length of service is their principal protection
against the loss of their jobs.9 Second, seniority enables labor to re-
duce management's options in determining work conditions.'" Third,
seniority, as a basic regulatory mechanism, provides unions with an ob-
jective standard for resolving internal disputes concerning employee
status. 11
Employers have also found seniority systems to be advantageous in
the management of business operations. Seniority systems enable em-
ployers to retain their most senior employees who are often their most
valuable workers by providing them with an important incentive to re-
main." Management also has recognized that some seniority systems
assure that employees eligible for promotion will have acquired valu-
able experience. 8
Seniority is the product of private arrangements between unions and
employers incorporated into collective bargaining agreements. 14  A
seniority system may be broadly defined as a set of rules governing job
movements and benefits in an employer unit, under which the most
senior person among a group of competing workers is preferred. 5
The set of rights which make up seniority are conveniently divided into
two categories: (1) competitive seniority, which includes the rights of
an employee relative to other employees in competitive situations, such
as layoffs, promotions and transfers; and (2) benefit seniority, which
guarantees the rights of the employee to benefits, usually financial, that
increase automatically with the length of service.' 6 Seniority may be
measured by total length of employment with an employer (employ-
ment seniority), in a department (department seniority), in a line of
progression (progression line seniority) or in a job (job seniority)."
This article is primarily concerned with the status of competitive em-
ployment seniority in situations demanding layoffs.
A basic issue which often arises between labor and management re-
lates to the specific weight to be assigned to length of service in de-
9. See generally Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of
Seniority Rights, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1535 (1962).
10. Id. at 1535.
11. See SLicTwR, supra note 8, at 104.
12. See Sobol, supra note 5, at 1606-07.
13. Id. at 1607.
14. See Gould, supra note 8, at 5-7.
15. See generally Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent Ne-
gro, 80 HAIv. L. REv. 1260, 1263 (1967).
16. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-14, MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY 7 (1972).
17. SLIcTER, supra note 8, at 116-17.
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termining the order of layoffs as opposed to the amount of discretion
to be reserved to management. The prevailing importance attached
to the use of seniority provisions in determining layoff orders is under-
scored by -the following statistics: Of all the major collective bargaining
agreements studied in 1970-71 by the United States Department of
Labor, seniority played some role in determining layoffs 99 percent of
the time; seniority was the sole factor in determining layoffs 28 percent
of the time; seniority was a primary factor in determining layoffs 44
percent of the time; and in less than 1 percent of those agreements
surveyed seniority played no role in determining layoffs.'" Therefore,
it is clear that actions which challenge the validity of seniority systems
may jeopardize the job security of many workers and lead to labor un-
rest.
The most basic form of seniority used in allocating layoffs is the "last
hired, first fired" system. Under this type of seniority system, those
employees with the least amount of employment time are the first to
be laid off. While a "last hired, first fired" seniority system is in itself
racially neutral, serious questions concerning the application of such a
procedure by employers who have followed discriminatory hiring prac-
tices in the past are presently being litigated. Minorities, claiming that
the direct effect of this practice is the perpetuation of prior racial dis-
crimination, have challenged its lawfulness under Title VII and section
1981.
"LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED" UNDER TITLE VII
Congress, by enacting Title VII, indicated its determination that pri-
vate employers were not exerting sufficient efforts to eliminate racial
discrimination in employment. Section 703(h) of Title VII is specific-
ally addressed to the use of seniority systems by employers. This pro-
vision establishes broad guidelines which must be satisfied before such
systems will be found nondiscriminatory in nature and in practice:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply dif-
ferent standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an
18. U.S. BuREu OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-13, MAJOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: LAYOFF, RECALL, AND WORKSHARING PROCE-
DURES, at 54, Table 11 (1972). The Bureau conducted an intense and detailed examina-
tion of the layoff provisions in a sample of 364 agreements, covering 2.1 million work-
ers. Each collective bargaining agreement covered 1,000 workers or more. All agree-
ments studied were due to expire in 1971 or later.
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intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin .... 19
Therefore, the lawfulness of a "last hired, first fired" seniority pro-
vision is dependent upon whether it qualifies as a bona fide seniority
or merit system.
Legislative History
Where statutory language, such as bona fide seniority system, is not
self explanatory, courts must often rely heavily upon legislative history
in ascertaining congressional intent. °20 Title VII originated in the
House of Representatives and consisted of the language now found in
section 703(a) of the Act. 21  The draft, as submitted by the House
Judiciary Committee 22 and passed by the House2 3 made no express
reference to seniority systems. This bill was brought to the Senate
floor by Senators Clark of Pennsylvania and Case of New Jersey, who
were appointed bipartisan captains of Title VII.2 4  Three interpretative
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1974) (emphasis added).
20. The Supreme Court relied on relevant legislative history in construing 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2(h) (1974) to require that employment tests be job related. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). In reference to the Miller-Tydings Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1973), the Supreme Court declared: "It is the sponsors that we look to
when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt." Shwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1950). The Supreme Court, in reference to section 4 of
the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254 (1965), stated: 'The language of section 4
is not free from ambiguity and the legislative history of the . . .Act becomes impor-
tant." Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254 (1956).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1974), in generally outlining unlawful employment
practices by employers, provides:(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
22. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963).
23. 110 CoNG. Rnc. 2510-804 (1964). Section 703(a) appeared as section 704(a)in the House bill. Before the bill passed the House, Representative Dowdy, fearing that
the bill's failure to speak directly to seniority systems would require the revision of es-
tablished seniority rights by plants that had previously discriminated against blacks, pro-
posed a last minute amendment. The amendment, which was quickly defeated, stated
that the provisions of Title VII:
shall not be applicable to any employer whose hiring and employment prac-
tices are pursuant to (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a sys-
tem which predicates its practices upon ability to produce, either in quantity
or quality; or (4) a determination based on any factor other than race, color,
religion, or national origin.
110 CONG. REc. 2727-28 (1964). Because the House disposed of the amendment with-
out any debate, it is not possible to determine whether its rejection was based on sub-
stantive deficiencies or due to faulty drafting.
24. 110 CONG. RrE. 6528 (1964). The bill was brought directly to the floor of the
Senate without any committee hearings.
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documents were submitted by Senator Clark, each of which expressly
declared that a "last hired, first fired" employment seniority system
would be preserved under Title VII even in those instances where an
employer had discriminated in hiring in past years. The first of these
documents, introduced by both Clark and Case, explained that:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its
effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a
business has been discriminating in the past and as a result has an
all-white working force, when the title comes into effect the em-
ployer's obligation would be simply to fill future vacancies on a
non-discriminatory basis. He would not be obliged---or indeed,
permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to prefer
Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give
them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers
hired earlier.2 5
Senator Clark, in responding to questions raised by Senator Dirksen
of Illinois, who later co-sponsored section 703(h) as an amendment
to the bill, again stressed that the adoption of Title VII would have
no prohibitory effect on "last hired, first fired" provisions.26 Clark also
entered into the record an interpretative memorandum written by the
Justice Department, which substantiated the Senator's belief that a "last
hired, first fired" seniority system would not be violative of Title VII.27
The Mansfield-Dirksen amendments were later presented on the
Senate floor as substitutes for the entire bill.28 One of these clarifying
amendments was offered to alleviate any doubts regarding the validity
25. Id. at 7213.
26. Question: Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, when
that management function is governed by a labor contract calling for promo-
tions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, labor con-
tracts call for "last hired, first fired". If the last hired are Negroes, is the em-
ployer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired and the re-
maining employees are white?
Answer: Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last
hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still
be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and not
because of his race.
Id. at 7217.
27. The Justice Department memorandum stated:
Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes
effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the
event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provi-
sion would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even
in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title,
white workers had more seniority than Negroes. Title VII is directed at dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It is per-
fectly clear that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance for promotion
because under established seniority rules he is "low man on the totem pole" he
is not being discriminated against because of his race.
id. at 7207. These three documents were never read or discussed on the Senate floor,
but were entered into the record.
28. Id. at 11,930.
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of seniority systems under Title VII and included the language now
found in section 703(h). 9 Senator Humphrey of Minnesota, a pro-
ponent of section 703(h), expressly negated any suggestion that the
amendment altered the prior construction of the bill offered by Clark
and Case:
The basic coverage and the substantive prohibitions of [Title VII]
remain almost unchanged. . . . INior have there been any sig-
nificant changes in the sections specifying what actions constitute
unlawful employment practices. 30
Humphrey also pointed out that the amendments had been added in
order to "remove certain ambiguities and uncertainties which existed
in the House text."'"
The bill passed the Senate in the basic form of the Mansfield-Dirk-
sen amendment.3 2  Just before House approval of the bill,83 Repre-
sentative McCulloch of Ohio, a supporter of the legislation, declared:
"The bill does not permit the Federal Government to destroy the job
seniority rights of either union or nonunion employees." 4
The general languag, of section 703(a),35 defining unlawful em-
ployment practices, receives a more specific meaning through the ex-
press reference in section 703(h) to bona fide seniority or merit sys-
tems. The introduction to section 703 (h) "[n]otwithstanding any
other provision of this chapter"36 reflects the intended qualifying na-
ture of that section with respect to section 703(a). The presence of
the three interpretative memoranda provided by Clark and Case and
the subsequent enactment of section 703(h) without any restrictions
on the prior interpretations as offered indicate that Congress did realize
the potential uses of "last hired, first fired" seniority provisions. Con-
gress in no way sought to limit the application of these seniority rules,
even in -those cases where white workers had acquired more seniority
than their minority counterparts due to discriminatory hiring practices
prior to the effective date of Title VII.
Conflicting Judicial Views on "Last Hired, First Fired"
In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co., 7
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1974). The relevant portions of this subsection are
quoted in text accompanying note 19 supra.
30. 110 CONG. REc. 12,721 (1964).
31. Id. at 12,725.
32. Id. at 14,511.
33. Id. at 15,897.
34. Id. at 15,893.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1974).
36. Id. § 2000e-2(h).
37. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S.
March 4, 1975) (74-1064).
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the Seventh Circuit dealt directly with the issue of whether a "last
hired, first fired" employment seniority clause, used in determining lay-
offs by a plant which had discriminated against blacks before 1964,
serves to perpetuate past racial discrimination and therefore constitutes
an unfair employment practice. The court held that such a seniority
provision was racially neutral, qualified as a bona fide seniority system
and in no way violated the mandate of Title VII 8
In Waters it was established at trial that since 1946 the defendants'39
collective bargaining contracts had provided for a "last hired, first
fired" seniority system for bricklayers. Seniority vested after a 90-day
probationary period and could be forfeited by layoffs of more than 2
years. The seniority system governed the order of layoffs and recalls
for bricklayers. The company did not hire its first black bricklayer
until 1964, although blacks had made employment inquiries as early
as 1947.
The suit was maintained by two blacks,4" one of whom (Waters)
had inquired about employment with the company in 1957 and was
not hired until 1964. Two months after being hired, he was laid off
before he could complete his probationary period and achieve contrac-
tual seniority status. Waters' layoff was one of several during late 1964
and 1965 which occurred as a result of an anticipated decrease in the
steel plant's bricklaying needs. By March, 1965, over 30 bricklayers
with up to 10 years seniority had been laid off. In March of 1967,
Waters was recalled by the company and accepted reinstatement.
38. Plaintiffs in Waters brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1974) and 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1974). The court held that defendant's employment seniority provision
violated neither statute. 502 F.2d at 1320.
39. The co-defendants were Wisconsin Steel Works of International Harvester Co.
and Local 21, United Order of American Bricklayers and Stone Masons.
40. Plaintiffs originally initiated their suit as a class action against both Wisconsin
Steel and Local 21. On Wisconsin Steel's motion, plaintiffs' claims were dismissed by
the district court on numerous procedural grounds. The trial court held that suits for
private racial discrimination in employment could not be brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1974), and that even if such a cause of action existed prior to 1964, it was, never-
theless, preempted by the enactment of Title VII in 1964. The court also concluded
that any action under section 1981 would be barred by the 120-day filing period of the
Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 858 (1974). The
court disposed of plaintiffs' count against Local 21 by holding that the union could not
be joined as a defendant since plaintiffs had not previously charged the local with dis-
criminatory practices in a proceeding before the United States Equal Employrfient Op-
portunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as EEOC). The court further held that
the action against Wisconsin Steel should also be dismissed. Since Local 21 and indi-
vidual white bricklayers could be adversely affected if plaintiffs' action continued, Local
21 and the bricklayers were necessary parties for just adjudication under FED. R. Civ.
P. 19. 301 F. Supp. 663, 665-67 (N.D. Ill. 1969). On appeal, the trial court was re-
versed and the cause remanded for trial. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970). Thereafter, plaintiffs abandoned
their class allegations and proceeded to trial on claims of individual discrimination
against the two defendants.
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Three months later he was again laid off because of a plant slowdown.
Waters later was recalled but refused this third offer of employment
because he had another job and also because he believed that his return
might prejudice his pending charges with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission 41 against Wisconsin Steel which he had filed in
May, 1966. The district court held that the "last hired, first fired"
seniority system negotiated between Wisconsin Steel and Local 21 for
purposes of determining job layoffs and recalls had its genesis in a
period of racial discrimination and thus failed as a bona fide seniority
system under Title VII and section 198 1.42
On appeal,43 Waters contended that Wisconsin Steel's employment
seniority system perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. He
relied on the facts that blacks were laid off before and recalled after
certain whites who might not otherwise have acquired seniority had
Wisconsin Steel not discriminated in hiring prior to 1964. Waters ar-
gued that such a system facilitated a return to the status quo of the
era when the company had hired no black bricklayers." Wisconsin
Steel based its defense upon the reasoning that:
Length of service is recognized in law and in fact as a racially neu-
tral criterion. The "last hired, first fired" seniority principle,
strictly and fairly applied, benefits not only senior employees but
also short-service workers who as yet have no contractual seniority
but do have an interest in achieving job security as they advance in
age and experience. 45
The Waters court primarily relied upon the substantial weight of the
three Clark memoranda in reaching its decision that the legislative
history of section 703(h) is "supportive of the claim that an employ-
ment seniority system ["last hired, first fired"] is a bona fide seniority
system under theAct."'46
41. Before filing suit, plaintiffs, in May of 1966, registered complaints with the Illi-
nois Fair Employment Practices Commission and the EEOC, charging Wisconsin Steel
with racial discrimination in its hiring and layoff procedures. Both commissions dis-
missed the charges for cause. As a result of new evidence, the EEOC, on July 10, 1968,
reassumed jurisdiction and determined that plaintiffs had cause to sue under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (1974).
42. 502 F.2d at 1317.
43. Both parties appealed the district court's decision. Plaintiffs' appeal rested on
the alleged inadequacy of the trial court's calculation of back pay and attorney's fees.
See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 13-20, Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. March 4,
1975) (74-1064).
44. See generally Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23-24, Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3475
(U.S. March 4, 1975) (74-1064).
45. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 17-18, Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502
F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. March 4,
1975) (74-1064).
46. 502 F.2d at 1318-19. The court's reliance on the Clark memoranda was but-
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The Waters rationale upholding the lawfulness of "last hired, first
fired" was later adopted by the Third Circuit in Jersey Central Power
& Light Co. v. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.47
The Jersey court concluded that a facially neutral, company-wide
seniority system, such as "last hired, first fired", is a bona fide seniority
system and should be sustained even though it may operate to the dis-
advantage of females and minority groups as a result of past employ-
ment practices. Through an analysis of the legislative history of section
703, the court found that Congress intended to bar proof of the per-
petuating effect of a plant-wide seniority system since it regarded such
a system as bona fide. The court reasoned that the only evidence
probative in a challenge to a plant-wide seniority system would be evi-
dence directed either to the neutrality of the seniority system or evi-
tressed by the previous judicial recognition of their importance in Quarles v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 519 (E.D. Va. 1968), and Local 189, United Papermakers
& Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
47. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975). In 1972, the EEOC found reasonable cause to be-
lieve that Jersey Central, a large public utility which employed over 3,859 employees,
had discriminated against minorities and females with respect to hiring and job assign-
ments. In 1974, a conciliation agreement was entered into by the company, the EEOC
and the unions. The agreement obligated the company to make reasonable efforts to
recruit minorities and females into jobs where they had in the past been under-utilized
or not employed. A 5-year affirmative action program was designed by the parties to
increase the percentage of minority employees. The conciliation agreement, which was
primarily concerned with the hiring, promotion and transfer of female and minority
group employees, contained no express seniority provision. Prior to the execution of
the conciliation accord, the company and the unions entered into a collective bargaining
agreement which provided for the application of a "last hired, first fired" employment
seniority system in regard to layoff orders.
Because of an economic slowdown in July of 1974, the company was compelled to
lay off 400 workers by December, 1974. The unions required strict adherence by the
company to the "last hired, first fired" provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The EEOC countered by claiming that layoffs determined by seniority alone would vio-
late the provisions of the conciliation agreement and Title VII. Confronted with two
seemingly conflicting contracts, the company sought a judgment declaring its rights and
duties under each. The company also sought a declaratory judgment with respect to its
obliations under Executive Order 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and
Title VII.
The district court, in granting the company's motion for summary judgment, declared
that the provisions of the conciliation agreement should prevail over the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement to the extent that the two agreements were in con-
flict. 8 FEP 690, 693 (D.C.N.J. 1974). The trial court ruled that the company's work
force should be kept as integrated as it was before the layoffs began in July of 1974,
even if this meant the establishment of three separate seniority lists for minority work-
ers, women and all other employees. Id. at 695. The district court specifically refused
to consider the issues involving Executive Order 11,246 and Title VII violations and in-
stead based its decision on an interpretation of the two contracts.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the trial court and found that no conflict ex-
isted between the contracts with respect to layoffs. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975). The
court held that the conciliation agreement's objective of increasing the percentage of fe-
male and minority employees would have to be achieved by an affirmative hiring prac-
tice and not by resort to a system of artificial seniority in firing situations. The court
regarded the conciliation agreement as unambiguous in its requirements that an increased
proportion of females and minorities be hired. Once hired, however, workers in these
classes were to be controlled by the terms and conditions of employment as set forth
in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 701-02.
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dence directed to ascertaining an intent to disguise discrimination.4"
A fact situation similar to that found in Waters confronted the district
court in Watkins v. United Steel Workers, Local 2369. This court,
however, reached a totally different conclusion regarding the validity
of a "last hired, first fired" employment seniority system under Title
VII.19 The court ignored the importance of the legislative history of
Title VII and relied on the holdings of prior cases concerned with job
or department seniority in transfer situations and union work referrral
systems. Judge Cassibry reasoned that a "last hired, first fired" sen-
iority provision, although neutral on its face, served to perpetuate past
discriminatory practices by formerly all-white plants and, therefore, did
not qualify as a bona fide seniority system under section 703(h)."
The Watkins trial court found that the Continental Can plant in Har-
vey, Louisiana, had been in operation for many years, but, with the
exception of two blacks hired during World War II, only whites were
hired at this plant until 1965. The company began hiring some black
workers in 1967 and 1968 and substantially increased the number of
black employees in 1969, 1970 and 1971. The period between 1971
and 1974 marked a noticeable cutback in employment at the Harvey
plant. Pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
between Continental Can and Local 2369, layoffs were made on the
basis of total employment seniority under a "last hired, first fired" proc-
ess. As a result, all of the black employees hired after 1965 were laid
off and the company's work force became all white except for the two
blacks hired in the 1940's.
Of particular importance in reaching its decision was the court's dis-
missal of the interpretative memoranda introduced by Senator Clark be-
fore the passage of Title VII 1 Judge Cassibry emphasized:
The Clark statements in the Senate certainly speak to the ques-
tion before the court, and if they accurately defined the meaning
of the statute the defendants would prevail. I am convinced, how-
ever, in light of the subsequent amendments to the bill in Congress,
and the judicial decisions under the Act, that Title VII has a
broader reach on questions of seniority. 52
48. Id. at 706.
49. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), app. pending (oral arguments were heard
on Jan. 20, 1975). Plaintiffs, black workers laid off by Continental Can Company,
brought this class action suit against the company and Local 2369 under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(h) (1974) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974). The trial court held that the employ-
ment seniority system was invalid under both statutes.
50. Id. at 1226.
51. 110 CONG. Rac. 7207, 7213, 7217 (1964).
52. 369 F. Supp. at 1228.
396
Vol. 6: 38 6
1975 Last Hired, First Fired
The court based its rejection of the Clark memoranda on strictly chron-
ological grounds. According to the court's reasoning, the Clark works
became discredited expressions of congressional intent when Congress
subsequently passed section 703(h) which deals directly with senior-
ity.5" The Watkins court, however, evaded the comments made by
Senator Humphrey, a sponsor of the Mansfield-Dirksen amendment, 54
which negated any suggestion that section 703(h) altered the prior
construction of the bill as offered by Senators Clark and Case.5
If the continued usefulness of the Clark memoranda was in doubt,
one would expect the United States Supreme Court to make that de-
termination when presented with such question. However, the Su-
preme Court, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., emphatically relied upon
the memoranda advanced by Clark and Case5 6 for a proper interpreta-
tion of section 703(h).5 7 In construing the testing provision of section
703(h) the court accorded great weight to two interpretative memo-
randa, even though, as in the case of the three statements on seniority,
they antedated the drafting of that section of Title VII.
The Watkins court drew on two lines of cases in reaching its deci-
sion to strike down the "last hired, first fired" seniority system as an
unlawful employment practice. In the first series of cases the courts
held that department or job seniority systems 8 were in violation of
53. Id. at 1229.
54. See 110 CONG. REc. 11,930-34 (1964).
55. Id. at 12,721, 12,725; see text accompanying notes 30 and 31 supra.
56. Id. at 7247, 13,504.
57. 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971). The Supreme Court reasoned: "From the sum of
the legislative history relevant in this case, the conclusion is inescapable that the EEOC's
construction of § 703 (h) to require that employment tests be job related comports with
congressional intent." The Third Circuit, in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. The
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975), utilized
the three Clark memoranda as a primary source in interpreting congressional intent con-
cerning the lawfulness of seniority systems under Title VII. In addressing the contention
that the Clark works should be rejected as an interpretive guide because of the subse-
quent enactment of section 703, the court in Jersey held:
We believe that the legislative statements made prior to the introduction of §
703(h) and dealing directly with seniority systems is entitled to weight in in-
terpreting congressional intent as to seniority systems, as the enactment of
§ 703(h) was not designed to change the intent and effect of Title VII.
Id. at 707 n.56. For use of the Clark memoranda before Griggs and Jersey, see Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 519 (E.D. Va. 1968); Local 189, United Paper-
makers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int. Ass'n, Local
36, 416 F.2d 123, 134 n.20 (8th Cir. 1969). The relevance of the three Clark mem-
oranda has been acknowledged by legal scholars as well. See Gould, supra note 8, at
8-9; Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 1260, 1270-71 (1967); Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 100-01 n.17 (1974).
The Watkins court's outright rejection of the Clark memoranda receives its sole sup-
port from an earlier work written by plaintiff's counsel in Watkins. Sobol, supra note
5, at 1611-14.
58. For a general discussion on the types of seniority, see text accompanying note
17 supra.
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Title VII when used to preclude blacks from attaining employment in
more desirable departments. Typically, black employees had been
limited to a few low paying jobs in separate departments or lines of
progression. With the passage of Title VII, employers were moved
to nominally lift restrictions on job transfers. However, many employ-
ers were quick to devise job or department seniority procedures which
precluded transferring minority employees from maintaining their pre-
viously earned seniority in the segregated units. Those minorities
desiring other work opportunities were placed at the bottom of the em-
ployee roster in the formlerly all-white department to which they trans-
ferred.
As a result of this seniority practice, minorities were effectively
deterred from seeking transfers to white departments. These seniority
systems have uniformly been found racially discriminatory on the
ground that employment preferences cannot be determined on the
basis of length of service in jobs or departments from which blacks have
been excluded. Instead, the courts have sought to remedy such dis-
crimination by allowing blacks transferring to formerly all white depart-
ments to take with them their total employment seniority. 5
From these cases which dealt exclusively with department or job
seniority systems, the Watkins court extracted the principle that "em-
ployment preferences cannot be allocated on the basis of length of ser-
vice or seniority, where blacks were, by virtue of prior discrimination,
prevented from accumulating relevant seniority. ' 6 The court broadly
applied this reasoning in invalidating layoff procedures under a "last
hired, first fired" employment seniority system.
Judge Cassibry admitted that ". . . the case at bar involves -the very
factual situation that was used as an example of the generality in the
Clark statements, while most of the decided cases involve situations
that are technically different."6 1  The court nevertheless failed to
recognize the importance of the distinction between the application of
59. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); Local 189,
United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652 (2d Cir. 1971), in which the court imposed a one-time or 2-year limitation on
blacks' right to transfer with full seniority carryover; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Rock v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co., 473 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 933 (1973); United States
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
939 (1973); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
906 (1972) where blacks were allowed by the court to use company seniority for trans-
fer purposes for one time.
60. 369 F. Supp. at 1226.
61. Id. at 1229.
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a "last hired, first fired" job or department seniority provision and the
use of a "last hired, first fired" employment seniority system. Under
the former, continuing restrictions on transfer and promotion create un-
earned or artificial expectations of preference in favor of white workers
when compared with incumbent minorities having an equal or greater
length of service with the employment unit. This situation is remedied
by allowing transferring blacks to carry their total or actual employment
seniority into white units. Blacks are not afforded artificial or con-
structive seniority at the expense of whites-they merely retain what
they have actually earned. Also, those minorities who are aided by
the above mentioned remedy are the actual victims of the previous dis-
crimination.
This court-enforced remedy is inappropriate in the context of em-
ployment seniority systems. Under this type of system, there is, by
definition, equal recognition of employment seniority which preserves
only the actual earned expectations of long-service employees. At-
tempts such as those made by the Watkins court to disband employ-
ment seniority systems and allow blacks with little employment senior-
ity to acquire constructive seniority equal to or greater than that held
by whites, lead to reverse discrimination through preferential treatment
granted to minorities. In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc.,62 the court
distinguished employment seniority rules in the light of legislative
history when it held: "[T]he legislative history [of section 703(h)]
leads the court to conclude that Congress did not intend to require 're-
verse discrimination'; that is the act does not require that Negroes be
preferred over white employees who possess employment seniority."
In Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United
States,63 The Fifth Circuit, in relying upon the legislative history of
62. 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968). In Quarles, employees of Phillip Morris
were historically assigned to four separate departments, each of which had its own job
progression ladder and its own seniority roster. Until 1966, interdepartmental transfers
by blacks were prohibited. After 1966, blacks were allowed to transfer to other depart-
ments but were prohibited from carrying with them their earned employment seniority.
Because most of the opportunities for advancement or for exercising other privileges
such as preferential day shifts and avoidance of layoffs were dependent upon department
seniority rather than employment seniority, blacks were reluctant to transfer to higher
departments and give up valuable seniority time. The court found that blacks did not
seek to oust white employees with less employment seniority, but rather demanded only
an opportunity to be trained and promoted to fill future vacancies on the same basis
as whites with equal ability and employment seniority. Id. at 514. The court held that
future seniority rights of employees qualified to transfer must be determined on the basis
of total employment seniority. Id. at 520-21.
63. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). In Local 189,
unlike Waters and ,Watkins, blacks were not treated according to their actual length of
service with their employer. Instead, the court found that the job seniority system ap-
plied by defendant Crown Zellerbach perpetuated prior discriminatory practices by deny-
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Title VII, carefully explained that it was the purpose of the Act to safe-
guard actual earned seniority, not to create special privileges in the
form of constructive seniority for minority employees:
No doubt, Congress, to prevent "reverse discrimination" meant to
protect certain seniority rights that could not have existed but for
previous racial discrimination. For example a Negro who had
been rejected by an employer on racial grounds before passage of
the Act could not, after being hired, claim to outrank whites who
had been hired before him but after his original rejection, even
though the Negro might have had senior status but for the past dis-
crimination. . . . [The treatment of "job" or "department
seniority" raises problems different from those discussed in the
Senate debates ....
It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of fictional
seniority for newly hired Negroes, and quite another thing for it to
require that time actually worked in Negro jobs be given equal
status with time worked in white jobs. To begin with, requiring
employers to correct their pre-Act discrimination by creating fic-
tional seniority for new Negro employees would not necessarily aid
the actual victims of the previous discrimination. There would be
no guaranty that the new employees had actually suffered exclu-
sion at the hands of the employer in the past, or, if they had, there
would be no way of knowing whether, after being hired, they would
have continued to work for the same employer. In other words,
creating fictional employment time for newly-hired Negroes would
comprise preferential rather than remedial treatment . . . . We
conclude, in agreement with Quarles, that Congress exempted
from the anti-discrimination requirements only those seniority
rights that gave white workers preference over junior Negores.64
The lawfulness of a "last hired, first fired" employment seniority
policy was even conceded by the prevailing counsel for the United
States in Local 189. The government specifically acknowledged that
ing transferring blacks employment seniority which they had compiled while in segre-
gated departments.
64. 416 F.2d at 994-95 (emphasis added). Sentiment against preferential treatment
on the basis of race was codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1974), which provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any indi-
vidual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classi-
fied for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, ad-
mitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to,
or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison
with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in
the available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
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such a system "does not give any class preferential treatment over an-
other" and that "competition for future job vacancies [would be on]
the basis of total length of service in the plant, a system which is fairer
and even handed by all.''65
The other line of cases relied upon by the Watkins court involved
union work referral rules in previously all-white craft unions. Under
these union policies,66 priority was given to those employees with long
work experience under a contract or in the particular industry. As a
result of their prior exclusion from craft work under union contracts,
blacks later found themselves in the lowest strata for purposes of job
referral by the unions. In all of these cases the referral systems were
held unlawful under Title VII, on the grounds that they perpetuated
the effects of past discrimination against blacks and presently deprived
them of an equal employment opportunity.6 7
The Watkins court borrowed the uniform holdings from these work
referral cases and relied on them as a basis for invalidating an employ-
er's layoff practice under a "last hired, first fired" employment seniority
provision .6  The court reasoned that union work referral rules and
employers' seniority systems are to be accorded identical treatment un-
der section 703(h). However, section 703(h) is only addressed to
employer-adopted seniority systems 9 and does not pertain to work re-
ferral systems used by unions to control access to new job openings. 70
65. Brief for United States at 28-29, Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). The
Local 189 reasoning was followed by the Fifth Circuit in Franks v. Bowman Transpor-
tation Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3510 (U.S.
March 25, 1975) (74-728), where the court refused to grant constructive seniority
to black job applicants who were unlawfully denied employment in the post-Act period.
66. In Teamsters Local 357 v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667, 674 (1961), the Supreme
Court ruled that union work referral systems are valid under the National Labor Rela-
tion Act §§ 7, 8(a)(1), (3), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1973), so long as they are
not used to create a closed shop.
67. See Dobbins v. Electrical Workers, Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 445 (S.D. Ohio
1968). The court held that a policy which grants priority in work referral to persons
who have experience under the local's collective bargaining agreement is discriminatory
when competent blacks have previously been denied work under the agreement by reason
of their race. A memorandum by Senator Clark [110 CONG. REC. 6986 (1964)] was
also cited by the court as evidence that Title VII does not require an employer to achieve
racial balance in his work force by giving preferential treatment to any individual or
group. See also United States v. Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
68. 369 F. Supp. at 1226.
69. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
70. A labor organization applying a work referral system which systematically ex-
cludes blacks from receiving employment violates 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(c) (1974), which
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization-
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for mem-
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The idea that distinct treatments should be afforded to union work re-
referral rules and employers' seniority systems was advanced by Senators
Clark and Case through a memorandum. They indicated that although
Title VII might not have the effect of requiring the displacement of
incumbent white workers, even where the incumbent work force was
restricted to whites, it does prohibit the use of referral lists for future
employment compiled on a discriminatory basis. 71
Both the legislative history and the language of section 703(h) war-
rant the conclusion that a union work referral system was never in-
tended to receive the same protection accorded a bona fide employer's
seniority system under Title V11. Therefore, decisions involving work
referral rules in previously all-white unions shed no reflection on the
lawfulness of employer-adopted employment seniority systems under
section 703(h).7 2
While the Watkins court did not hesitate to strike down the "last
hired, first fired" employment seniority system, the court was prepared
only to suggest possible remedies.7 3  The court intimated that the best
remedy available would involve "the apportionment of layoffs among
whites and blacks on the basis of the proportion of each group to the
total workforce. Then the employees to 'be laid off could be selected
within each racial group on the basis of plant seniority.' ' 74 However,
bership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individ-
ual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
71. The distinction between treatments afforded to union work referral systems and
employers' seniority systems under Title VII, as raised by the Clark-Case memorandum
[110 CoNG. REc. 6992 (1964)] was relied on in United States v. Sheet Metal Workers,
F.2d 123, 134 n.20 (8th Cir. 1969). The court, while quoting the memorandum as sup-
port for the invalidation of a union work referral system applied in a discriminatory
manner, also acknowledged that the Clark-Case statement stood as an indication of the
separate protection to be accorded seniority systems under Title VII.
72. As support for its decision to restrict the use of the "last hired, first fired" em-
ployment seniority system by employers who formerly discriminated in hiring, the Wat-
kins court also cited Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972) and
Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ala. 1971). In Rowe and Allen,
blacks who sought access to new job opportunities in services previously restricted to
whites challenged employment practices which dealt in part with the use of seniority in
allocating promotions and job assignments. These decisions do not involve the issue of
whether layoff determinations based solely on an employee's total length of service vio-
liate Title VII or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974).
73. Plaintiffs, in their motion, requested the court to defer the question of remedy
so that the parties could have an opportunity to confer on the matter and possibly pro-
pose a joint remedy. This request was granted. 369 F. Supp. at 1232.
74. Id. In finding that neither the union nor its members contributed substantially
to Continental Can's all-white hiring policy, the court proposed that the company, rather
than a few white employees, should bear the primary burden of correcting the discrimi-
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such a proposal, as later emphasized by -the court in Waters,75 would
invariably lead to a form of reverse discrimination by shackling white
employees with a burden of a past discrimination created not by them
but by their employer. Allowing blacks with less seniority than whites
to retain their jobs would be tantamount to the creation of "fictional
employment time for newly hired blacks" and would comprise the
"preferential treatment" which the court in Local 189 specifically
warned against. 76  The clear thrust of Title VII is directed against just
such a form of preferential treatment on the basis of race. As the Su-
preme Court explained in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.:
The Act does not command that any person be hired simply because
he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a
member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any
group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress
has proscribed.77
TITLE VII VS. SECTION 1981: SUBSTANTIVE INCONSISTENCIES?
Minorities have also challenged the validity of "last hired, first fired"
employment seniority systems under section 1981.78 Plaintiffs in Wat-
kins and Waters pleaded alternatively under Title VII and section
1981.79 The latter, which has been interpreted as a general prohibi-
tion against discrimination, °8 has also been construed to confer a right
of action against racial discrimination in employment. 8 ' The federal
nation that had occurred since the 1971 layoffs. However, its suggestion that the com-
pany reemploy blacks who were laid off discriminatorily since 1971, and utilize a larger
work force with some reduction in working hours until normal attrition reduces the work
force to its most efficient level, would also grant privileges to blacks at the expense of
innocent whites. Under this proposal, whites would suffer a loss in work hours and pay.
Another remedy suggested by the court would have blacks, who are on the recall list
with little seniority, receive priority rights to employment in the next openings. Here
again, blacks with less seniority than laid off white workers would be granted special
treatment at the expense of the latter.
75. 502 F.2d at 1320.
76. 416 F.2d at 994-95 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); see text
accompanying note 64 supra.
77. 401 U.S. at 430-31 (1971) (emphasis added).
78. For complete text of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974), see note 3 supra.
79. In Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 911 (1970), the court held on appeal that plaintiffs had an independent remedy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974), without first exhausting their rights under Title VII.
80. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Supreme Court was
asked to determine the scope and constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974). Both
42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 were derivatives of section I of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. The Court held that section 1, and its derivatives, prohibit "all racial dis-
crimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property .... ." 392 U.S.
at 437. The Court also noted that "the right to contract for employment [is] a right
secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1981.... ." 392 U.S. at 442 n.78.
81. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 911 (1970); Sanders v. Dobbs House, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437
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courts have uniformly affirmed the position that the equal employment
provisions of Title VII do no supersede the provisions of section 1981.
Additionally, the specific remedies fashioned by Congress in Title VII
were not intended to preempt the general remedial language of section
1981.82 Congress has defeated amendments drawn to establish Title
VII as the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination,8  and as
a result, litigants have relied on Title VII and section 1981 for pro-
cedurally separate courses of relief.8 4
A question remains whether section 1981 may be used to invalidate
a seniority system that is valid under Title VII. The argument has
been advanced that section 1981 is not restricted by any of the legisla-
tive history of Title VII which was enacted 98 years later and, there-
fore, that one may prevail under the older Civil Rights Act regardless
of the outcome of one's case under Title VII.s5  The court in Waters
rejected this reasoning and held that a seniority system which is accept-
able under Title VII must also be deemed lawful under section 1981.'
The Watkins court acknowledged the possibility that an employment
practice could be held lawful under one statute and unlawful under
the other but quickly added that ". . . it would clearly be an undesir-
able result to construct two separate bodies of substantive law for the
enforcement of the two statutes. 8 7  While courts have found that
remedial differences may at times exist under the two acts, no deci-
sion has been rendered which would sanction substantive inconsisten-
cies between Title VII and section 1981.88 Instead, the courts have
F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Hill v. American Airlines Inc., 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.
1973); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974).
82. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1971), the Supreme
Court explained: "[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a Congressional in-
tent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and
other applicable state and federal statutes." See also Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine
Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 (5th Cir. 1971).
83. 110 CONG. REc. 13,650-52 (1964); 118 CONo. Ruc. 152426 (1972).
84. For a thorough discussion of employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(1974), see Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Dis-
crimination in Private Employment, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lm. L. REv. 56, 68-84(1972); Comment, Is Section 1981 Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964? 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223, 1235.
85. Reply Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 25, Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502
F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. March 4,
1975) (74-1064).
86. 502 F.2d at 1320 n.4.
87. 369 F. Supp. at 1230.
88. See Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 14, Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S.
March 4, 1975) (74-1064) in which defendant maintained that Congress did not intend
substantive inconsistencies to exist between the two statutes. Defendant argued that Ti-
tle VII's explicit approval of bona fide seniority systems should modify and control the
application of seniority provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974). This reasoning finds
support in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (4th
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held that conflicts between the two acts should be resolved whenever
possible.89 The Supreme Court, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
has recently held that "[1]egislative enactments in this area [civil
rights] have long evinced a general intent ,to accord parallel or over-
lapping remedies against discrimination." 90  Therefore, in fashioning
a body of substantive law under section 1981, and as a means of avoid-
ing undesirable substantive law conflicts, the courts should look to the
specific principles of law created under Title VII for direction.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Title VII and section 1981 are directed against those employment
practices which allocate layoffs on the basis of race, color, religion, sex
or national origin. An employer has the absolute duty under each of
these acts to order layoffs and fill vacancies on a nondiscriminatory
basis. Title VII, however, specifically guarantees the existence of
those seniority rules which are racially neutral and thus qualify as bona
fide systems under section 703(h). In their search for the meaning
of bona fide seniority system, most courts have received guidance
through examination of the legislative history behind Title VII. The
congressional records reveal, first, that Title VII was designed to have
no effect on those seniority rights established before 1964. The effect
of Title VII is prospective and not retrospective. Second, the drafters
of Title VII did not intend to destroy seniority provisions which use
total length of service as the sole basis for determining layoff and re-
call orders. Instead, Congress exempted from the anti-discrimination
requirements of the Act those seniority systems that give senior work-
ers preferred rights over junior employees.
The legislative history of Title VII, and in particular the three
memoranda on seniority presented by Senators Clark and Case, estab-
lish that the members of Congress were aware of the industry-wide
acceptance of "last hired, first fired" seniority systems and were ada-
mant in their intent to protect these systems under the Act. Race is
not a criterion in the operation of a "last hired, first fired" employment
seniority system. Such a system operates on the sole objective element
Cir. 1971), rev'd in part, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). The circuit court held that since the
1964 Civil Rights Act contains an exception to the ban on racial discrimination in a
given area it will effectively amend the earlier and more general section 1981 in any
case where the 1866 Act prohibits the same conduct which is saved as lawful by the
terms of the 1964 Act.
89. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 485 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 911 (1970).
90. 415 U.S. at 47.
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of actual length of service. Under Title VII, the "last hired" employee
can be the "first fired" as long as he is released because of his status
as "last hired" and not because of his race. This holds true even in
those situations where because of pre-1964 discriminatory hiring prac-
tices, minorities have been unable to compile enough seniority to se-
cure their jobs against layoffs. The crux of the law is whether the
employer honors each worker's earned seniority and thus gives equal
effect to white and black time actually spent on the job.
It is true that the legislative history of Title VII does not predeter-
mine the outcome of employment discrimination suits under section
1981. However, it is equally obvious that substantive harmony under
two federal statutes pertaining to the same area in the law of civil rights
is not only desirable but of practical necessity for the smooth and con-
sistent operation of our legal system. The creation of two substantive
bodies of law, conflicting in their application would be intolerably un-
fair to prospective litigants faced with the task of defending their con-
duct. Instead, the sanctions devised under ,the latter and more specific
Act of 1964, which expressly protect a "last hired, first fired" seniority
system, must be respected by courts entertaining suits under section
1981.
Assaults by -the courts against the operation of "last hired, first fired"
seniority systems under the guise of fostering racial justice constitute
patent examples of judicial legislation which should not be condoned.
DAVID M. HELLER
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